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Introduction
Introduction
Different approaches have been introduced by researchers in the field of pri-
vacy preserving data mining. These approaches have in general the advantage
to require a minimum amount of input (usually the database, the information to
protect and few other parameters) and then a low effort is required to the user
in order to apply them. However, some tests performed by Bertino, Nai and
Parasiliti [10,97] show that actually some problems occur when applying PPDM
algorithms in contexts in which the meaning of the sanitized data has a critical
relevance. More specifically, these tests (see Appendix A for more details), show
that the sanitization often introduces false information or completely changes
the meaning of the information. These phenomenas are due to the fact that,
current approaches to PPDM algorithms do not take into account two relevant
aspects:
• Relevance of data: not all the information stored in the database has
the same level of relevance and not all the information can be dealt in
the same way. An example may clarify this concept. Consider a categoric
database1 and assume we wish to hide the rule AB → CD. A privacy-
preserving association mining algorithm would retrieve all transactions
supporting this rule and then change some items (e.g. item C) in these
transactions in order to change the confidence of the rule. Clearly, if the
item C has low relevance, the sanitization will not affect much the quality
of the data. If, however, item C represents some critical information, the
sanitization can result in severe damages to the data.
• Structure of the database: information stored in a database is strongly
influenced by the relationships between the different data items. These
relationships are not always explicit. Consider as an example an Health
Care database storing patient’s records. The medicines taken by patients
are part of this database. Consider two different medicines, say A and B
and assume that the following two constraints are defined: “The maximum
amount of medicine A per day must be 10ml. If the patient also takes
1We define a categoric database a database in which attributes have a finite (but eventually
large) number of distinct values with no ordering among the values. An example is the Market
Basket database.
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medicine B the max amount of A must be 5ml”. If a PPDM algorithm
modifies the data concerning to the amount of medicine A without taking
into account these constraints, the effects on the health of the patient
could be potentially catastrophic.
Analyzing these observations, we argue that the general problem of current
PPDM algorithms is related to Data Quality. In [70], a well known work in the
data quality context, Orr notes that data quality and data privacy are in some
way often related. More precisely an high quality of data often corresponds a
low level of privacy. It is not simple to explain this correlation. We try in this
introduction to give an intuitive explanation of this fact in order to give an idea
of our intuition.
Any “Sanitization” on a target database has an effect on the data quality
of the database. It is obvious to deduce that, in order to preserve the quality
of the database, it is necessary to take into consideration some function Π(DB)
representing the relevance and the use of the data contained in the DB. Now,
by taking another little step in the discussion, it is evident that the function
Π(DB) has a different output for different databases2. This implies that a
PPDM algorithm trying to preserve the data quality needs to know specific
information about the particular database to be protected before executing the
sanitization.
We believe then, that the data quality is particularly important for the case of
critical database, that is database containing data that can be critical for the
life of the society (e.g. medical database, Electrical control system database,
military Database etc.). For this reason data quality must be considered as the
central point of every type of data sanitization.
In what follows we present a more detailed definition of DQ. We introduce a
schema able to represent the Π function and we present two algorithms based
on DQ concept.
2We use here the term “different” in its wide sense, i.e. different meaning of date, different
use of data, different database architecture and schema etc.
Chapter 1
Data Quality Concepts
Traditionally DQ is a measure of the consistency between the data views pre-
sented by an information system and the same data in the real-world [70]. This
definition is strongly related with the classical definition of information system
as a “model of a finite subset of the real world” [56]. More in detail Levitin
and Redman [59] claim that DQ is the instrument by which it is possible to
evaluate if data models are well defined and data values accurate. The main
problem with DQ is that its evaluation is relative [94], in that it usually de-
pends from the context in which data are used. DQ can be assumed as a
complex characteristic of the data itself. In the scientific literature DQ is con-
sidered a multi-dimensional concept that in some environments involves both
objective and subjective parameters [8,104,105]. Table 1 lists of the most used
DQ parameters [104].
Accuracy Format Comparability Precision Clarity
Reliability Interpretability Conciseness Flexybility Usefulness
Timeliness Content Freedom from bias Understandability Quantitativeness
Relevance Efficiency Informativeness Currency Sufficiency
Completeness Importance Level of Detail consistence Usableness
Table 1.1: Data Quality parameters
In the context of PPDM, DQ has a similar meaning, with however an impor-
tant difference. The difference is that in the case of PPDM the real world is the
original database, and we want to measure how closely the sanitized database
is to the original one with respect to some relevant properties. In other words
we are interested in assessing whether, given a target database, the sanitization
phase will compromise the quality of the mining results that can be obtained
from the sanitized database. In order to understand better how to measure DQ
we introduce a formalization of the sanitization phase. In a PPDM process a
given database DB is modified in order to obtain a new database DB ′.
7
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Definition 1
Let DB be the database to be sanitized. Let ΓDB be the set of all the aggregate
information contained in DB. Let ΞDB ⊆ ΓDB be the set of the sensitive in-
formation to hide. A transformation ξ : D → D, where D is the set of possible
instances of a DB schema, is a perfect sanitization if Γξ(DB) = ΓDB − ΞDB
In other words, the ideal sanitization is the one that completely removes the
sensitive high level information, while preserving at the same time the other
information. This would be possible in the case in which constraints and rela-
tionship between the data and between the information contained in the data-
base do not exist, or, roughly speaking, assuming the information to be a simple
aggregation of data, if the intersection between the different information is al-
ways equal to ∅. However, this hypothetical scenario, due to the complexity
of modern databases in not possible. In fact, as explained in the introduction
of this section, we must take into account not only the high level information
contained in the database, but we must also consider the relationships between
different information or different data, that is the Π function we mentioned in
the previous section. In order to identify the possible parameters that can be
used to assess the DQ in the context of PPDM Algorithms, we performed a set
of tests. More in detail we perform the following operations:
1. We built a set of different types of database, with different data structures
and containing information completely different from the meaning and the
usefulness point of view.
2. We identified a set of information judged relevant for every type of data-
base.
3. We applied a set of PPDM algorithms to every database in order to protect
the relevant information.
Observing the results, we identified the following four categories of damages
(or loss of quality) to the informative asset of the database:
• Ambiguous transformation: This is the case in which the transforma-
tion introduces some uncertainty in the non sensitive information, that
can be then misinterpreted. It is for example the case of aggregation algo-
rithms and Perturbation algorithms. It can be viewed even as a precision
lack when for example some numerical data are standardized in order to
hide some information.
• Incomplete transformation: The sanitized database results incom-
plete. More specifically, some values of the attributes contained in the
database are marked as “Blank”. For this reason information may result
incomplete and cannot be used. This is typically the effect of the Blocking
PPDM algorithm class.
• Meaningless transformation: In this case the sanitized database con-
tains information without meaning. That happen in many cases when
9perturbation or heuristic-based algorithms are applied without taking into
account the meaning of the information stored into the database.
• Implicit Constraints Violation: Every database is characterized by
some implicit constraints derived from the external world that are not
directly represented in the database in terms of structure and relation (the
example of medicines A and B presented in the previous section could be
an example). Transformations that do not consider these constraints risk
to compromise the database introducing inconsistencies in the database
The results of these experiments magnify the fact that, in the context of
privacy preserving data mining, only a little portion of the parameters showed
in table 1.1 are of interest. More in details, are relevant the parameters allowing
to capture a possible variation of meaning or that are indirectly related with
the meaning of the information stored in a target database. Therefore, we
identify as most appropriate DQ parameters for PPDM Algorithms the following
dimensions:
• Accuracy: it measures the proximity of a sanitized value a’ to the original
value a. In an informal way, we say that a tuple t is accurate if the
sanitization has not modified the attributes contained in the tuple t
• Completeness: it evaluates the percentage of data from the original data-
base that are missing from the sanitized database. Therefore a tuple t is
complete if after the sanitization every attribute is not empty.
• Consistency: it is related to the semantic constraints holding on the data
and it measures how many of these constraints are still satisfied after the
sanitization.
We now present the formal definitions of those parameters for use in the
remainder of the discussion.
Let OD be the original database and SD be the sanitized database resulting
from the application of the PPDM algorithm. Without loosing generality and
in order to make simpler the following definitions, we assume that OD (and con-
sequently SD) be composed by a single relation. We also adopt the positional
notation to denote attributes in relations. Thus, let odi (sdi) be the i-th tuple
in OD (SD), then odik (sdik) denotes the k
th attribute of odi (sdi). Moreover,
let n be the total number of the attributes of interest, we assume that attributes
in positions 1, . . . ,m (m ≤ n) are the primary key attributes of the relation.
Definition 2
Let sdj be a tuple of SD. We say that sdj is Accurate if ¬∃odi ∈ OD such
that ((odik = sdjk)∀k = 1..m ∧ ∃(odif 6= sdjf ), (sdjf 6= NULL), f = m +
1, .., n)).
Definition 3
A sdj is Complete if (∃odi ∈ OD such that (odik = sdjk)∀k = 1..m) ∧
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(¬∃(sdjf = NULL), f = m + 1, .., n).
Where we intend for “NULL” value a value without meaning in a well defined
context.
Let C be the set of the constraints defined on database OD, in what follows
we denote with cij the j
th constraint on attribute i. We assume here constraints
on a single attribute, but, it is easily possible to extend the measure to complex
constraints.
Definition 4
A tuple sdk is Consistent if ¬∃cij ∈ C such that cij(sdki) = false, i = 1..n
Starting from these definitions, it is possible to introduce three metrics (reported
in Table 1.2), that allow us to measure the lack of accuracy, completeness and
consistency. More specifically, we define the lack of accuracy as the proportion
of non accurate items (i.e. the amount of items modified during the sanitiza-
tion), with respect to the number of items contained in the sanitized database.
Similarly, the lack of completeness is defined as the proportion of non complete
items (i.e. the items substituted with a NULL value during the sanitization)
with respect to the total number of items contained in the sanitized database.
The consistency lack, is simply defined as the number of constraints violation
in SD due to the sanitization phase.
Name Short Explanation Expression
Accuracy Lack The proportion of non accurate items in SD λSD =
|SDnacc|
|SD|
Completeness Lack The proportion of non complete items in SD ϑSD =
|SDnc|
|SD|
Consistency Lack The number of constraint violations in SD $SD = Nc
Table 1.2: The three parameters of interest in PPDM DQ evaluation. In the
expressions SDnacc denoted the set of not accurate items, SDnc denotes the set
of not complete items and NC denotes the number of constraint violations
Chapter 2
The Data Quality Scheme
In the previous section, we have presented a way to measure DQ in the sani-
tized database. These parameters are, however, not sufficient to help us in the
construction of a new PPDM algorithm based on the preservation of DQ. As
explained in the introduction of this report, the main problem of actual PPDM
algorithms is that they are not aware of the relevance of the information stored
in the database, nor of the relationships among these information.
It is necessary to provide then a formal description that allow us to magnify
the aggregate information of interest for a target database and the relevance of
DQ properties for each aggregate information (for some aggregate information
not all the DQ properties have the same relevance). Moreover, for each aggre-
gate information, it is necessary to provide a structure in order to describe the
relevance (in term of consistency, completeness and accuracy level required) at
the attribute level and the constraints the attributes must satisfy. The Infor-
mation Quality Model (IQM) proposed here addresses this requirement.
In the following, we give a formal definition of Data Model Graph (DMG)
(used to represent the attributes involved in an aggregate information and their
constraints) and Aggregation Information Schema (AIS). Moreover we give a
definition for an Aggregate information Schema Set (ASSET). Before giving the
definition of DMG, AIS and ASSET we introduce some preliminary concepts.
Definition 5
An Attribute Class is defined as the tuple ATC =< name,AW,AV,CW,CV,CSV, Slink >
where:
• Name is the attribute id
• AW is the accuracy weight for the target attribute
• AV is the accuracy value
• CW is the completeness weigh for the target attribute
• CV is the completeness value
11
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• CSV is the consistency value
• Slink is list of simple constraints.
An attribute class, represents an attribute of a target database schema, in-
volved in the construction of a certain aggregate information for which we want
to evaluate the data quality. The attributes, however, have a different relevance
in an aggregate information. For this reason a set of weights is associated to
every attribute class, specifying, for example, if for a certain attribute a lack of
accuracy must be considered as relevant damage or not.
The attributes are the bricks of our structure. However, a simple list of at-
tributes in not sufficient. In fact, in order to evaluate the consistency property,
we need to take in consideration also the relationships between the attributes.
The relationships, can be represented by logical constraints, and the validation
of these constraints give us a measure of the consistency of an aggregate infor-
mation. As in the case of the attributes, also for the constraints we need to
specify their relevance (i.e. a violation of a constraint cause a negligible or a
severe damage?). Moreover there exists constraints involving at the same time
more then two attributes. In what follows the definitions of simple constraint
and complex constraint are showed.
Definition 6
A Simple Constraint Class is defined as the tuple SCC =< name,Constr, CW,Clink, CSV >
where:
• Name is the constraint id
• Constraint describes the constraint using some logic expression
• CW is the weigh of the constraint. It represents the relevance of this
constraint in the AIS
• CSV is the number of violations to the constraint
• Clink it is the list of complex constraints defined on SCC .
Definition 7
A Complex Constraint Class is defined as the tuple CCC =< name,Operator,
CW,CSV, SCC link > where:
• Name is the Complex Constraint id
• Operator is the “Merging” operator by which the simple constraints are
used to build the complex one.
• CW is the weigh of the complex constraint
• CSV is the number of violations
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• SCC link is the list of all the SCC that are related to the CCC .
We have now the bricks and the glue of our structure. A DMG is a collection
of attributes and constraints allowing one to describe an aggregate information.
More formally, let D be a database:
Definition 8
A DMG (Data Model Graph) is an oriented graph with the following features:
• A set of nodes NA where each node is an Attribute Class
• A set of nodes SCC where each node describes a Simple Constraint Class
• A set of nodes CCC where each node describes a Complex Constraint Class
• A set of direct edges LNj,Nk : LNj,Nk ∈ ((NAXSCC) ∪ (SCCXCCC) ∪
(SCCXNA) ∪ (CCCXNA)).
As is the case of attributes and constraints, even at this level, there exists ag-
gregate information more relevant than other. We define then an AIS as follows:
Definition 9
An AIS φ is defined as a tuple < γ, ξ, λ, ϑ,$,WAIS > where: γ is a name, ξ
is a DMG, λ is the accuracy of AIS, ϑ is the completeness of AIS, $ is the
consistency of AIS and WAIS represent the relevance of AIS in the database.
In a database there are usually more than an aggregate information for which
one is interested to measure the quality.
Definition 9
With respect to D we define ASSET (Aggregate information Schema Set) as
the collection of all the relevant AIS of the database.
The DMG completely describes the relations between the different data items
of a given AIS and the relevance of each of these data respect to the data quality
parameter. It is the “road map” that is used to evaluate the quality of a sanitized
AIS
As it is probably obvious, the design of a good IQM schema and more in
general of a good ASSET, it is fundamental to characterize in a correct way the
target database.
2.0.1 An IQM Example
In order to magnify which is the real meaning of a data quality model, we give
in this section a brief description of a possible context of application and we
then describe an example of IQM Schema.
The Example Context
Modern power grid starting today to use Internet, and more generally public
network, in order to monitor and to manage remotely electric apparels (local
14 CHAPTER 2. THE DATA QUALITY SCHEME
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Figure 2.1: Example of DMG
energy stations, power grid segments etc.) [62]. In such a context, there exist a
lot of problems related to system security and to the privacy preservation.
More in details, we take as example a very actual privacy problem caused
by the new generation of home electricity meters. In fact, such a type of new
meters, are able to collect a big number of information related to the home
energy consumption. Moreover, they are able to send the collected information
to a central remote database. The information stored in such database can be
easily classified as sensitive.
For example, the electricity meters can register the energy consumption per
hour and per day in a target house. From the analysis of this information it
is easy to retrieve some behavior of the people living in this house (i.e. from
the 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. the house is empty, from the 1 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. some-
one is at home, from the 8 p.m. the whole family is at home etc.). This
type of information is obviously sensitive and must be protected. On the other
hand, information like the maximum energy consumption per family, the av-
erage consumption per day, the subnetwork of pertinence and so on, have an
high relevance for the analysts who want to correctly analyze the power grid
to calculate for example the amount of power needed in order to guarantee an
acceptable service over a certain energy subnetwork.
This is a good example of a situation in which the application of a privacy
preserving techniques without knowledge about the meaning and the relevance
15
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Figure 2.2: Example ASSET: to every AIS contained in the Asset the dimensions
of Accuracy, Completeness and Consistency are associated. Moreover, to every
AIS the proper DMG is associated. To every attribute and to every constraint
contained in the DMG, the three local DQ parameters are associated
of the data contained in the database could cause a relevant damage (i.e. wrong
power consumption estimation and consequently blackout).
An IQM Example
The electric meters database contains several information related to energy con-
sumption, average electric frequency, fault events etc. It is not our purpose to
describe here the whole database. In order to give an example of IQM schema
we describe two tables of this database and two DMG of a possible IQM schema.
In our example, we consider the tables related to the localization information
of the electric meter and the information related to the per day consumption
registered by a target electric meter.
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More in details, the two table we consider have the following attributes:
Localization Table
• Energy Meter ID : it contains the ID of the energy meter.
• Local Code: it is the code of the city/region in which the meter is.
• City : it contains the name of the city in which the home hosting the meter
is.
• Network : it is the code of the electric network.
• Subnetwork : it is the code of the electric subnetwork.
Per Day Data consumption table
• Energy Meter ID: it contains the ID of the energy meter.
• Average Energy Consumption: it contains the average energy used by
the target home during a day.
• Date: It contains the date of registration.
• Energy consumption per hour: it is a vector of attributes containing the
average energy consumption per hour.
• Max Energy consumption per hour: it is a vector of attributes contain-
ing the maximum energy consumption per hour.
• Max Energy Consumption: it contains the maximum energy consump-
tion per day measured for a certain house.
As we have already underlined, from this information it is possible to guess
several sensitive information related to the behavior of the people living in a
target house controlled by an electric meter. For this reason it is necessary to
perform a sanitization process in order to guarantee a minimum level of privacy.
However, a sanitization without knowledge about the relevance and the
meaning of data can be extremely dangerous. In figure 2.3 two DMG schemas
associated to the data contained in the previously described tables are showed.
In what follows, we give a brief description about the two schema.
AIS Loc
The AIS Loc is mainly related to the data contained in the localization table. As
it is possible to see in figure 2.3 there exist some constraints associated with the
different items contained in this table. For example we require the local code be
in a range of values between 1 and 1000 (every different code is meaningless and
cannot be interpreted; moreover a value out of this range reveals to malicious
user that the target tuple is sanitized). The weight of this constraint is then
high (near to 1).
17
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Figure 2.3: Example of two DMG schemas associated to a National Electric
Power Grid database
Moreover, due to the relevance of the information about the regional local-
ization of the electric meter, even the weights associated with the completeness
and the accuracy of the local code have an high value.
A similar constraint exists even over the subnetwork code. With regard to
the completeness and the accuracy of this item, a too high weight may compro-
mise the ability to hide sensitive information. In other words, considering the
three main localization items, local code, network number, subnetwork number,
it is reasonable to think about a decreasing level of accuracy and completeness.
In this way, we try to guarantee the preservation of information about the area
of pertinence, avoiding the exact localization of the electric meter (i.e. “I know
that it is in a certain city, but I do not know the quarter in which it is”).
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AIS Cons
In figure 2.3 is showed a DMG (AIS Cons) related to the energy consump-
tion table. In this case the value of the information stored in this table, is
mainly related to the maximum energy consumption and the average energy
consumption. For this reason their accuracy and completeness weights must
be high (to magnify their relevance in the sanitization phase). However, it
is even necessary to preserve the coherence between the values stored in the
Energy consumption per hour vector and the average energy consumption per
day. In order to do this, a complex constraint is used. In this way we describe
the possibility to permute or to modify the values of energy consumption per
hour (in the figure En 1 am ..En 2 am etc.) maintaining however the average
energy consumption consistent.
At the same way it is possible to use another complex constraint in order
to express the same concept for the maximum consumption per day in relation
with the maximum consumption per hour. Exist finally a relation between the
maximum energy consumption per hour and the correspondent average con-
sumption per hour. In fact the max consumption per hour cannot be smaller
than the average consumption per hour. This concept is represented by a set
of simple constraints. Finally the weight of accuracy and completeness of the
Energy Meter ID are equal to 1, because a condition needed to make consistent
the database is to maintain at least the individuality of the electric meters.
By the use of these two schemas, we described some characteristics of the
information stored in the database, related with their meaning and their usage.
In the following chapters, we show some PPDM algorithms realized in order to
use these additional schema in order to perform a softer (from the DQ point of
view) sanitization
Chapter 3
Data Quality Based
Algorithms
A large number of Privacy Preserving Data Mining algorithms have been pro-
posed. The goal of these algorithms is to prevent privacy breaches arising from
the use of a particular Data Mining Technique. Therefore algorithms exist
designed to limit the malicious use of Clustering Algorithms, of Classification
Algorithms, of Association Rule algorithms.
In this report, we focus on Association Rule Algorithms. We choose to study
a new solution for this family of algorithms for the following motivations:
• Association Rule Data Mining techniques has been investigated for about
20 years. For this reason exists a large number of DM algorithms and
application examples exist that we take as a starting point to study how
to contrast the malicious use of this technique.
• Association Rule Data Mining can be applied in a very intuitive way to
categoric databases. A categoric database can be easily synthesized by
the use of automatic tools allowing us to quickly obtain for our tests a big
range of different type of databases with different characteristics.
• Association Rules seem to be the most appropriate to be used in combi-
nation with the IQM schema.
• Results of classification data mining algorithms can be easily converted
into association rules. This it is in prospective very important, because it
allows us to transfer the experience in association rule PPDM family to
the classification PPDM family without much effort.
In what follows, we present before some algorithms developed in the context of
Codmine project [97] (we remember here that our contribution in the Codmine
Project was related to the algorithm evaluation and to the testing framework
and not with the Algorithm development). We present then some considerations
19
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about these algorithms and finally we present our new approach to association
rule PPDM algorithms.
3.1 ConMine Algorithms
We present here a short description of the privacy preserving data mining algo-
rithms, which have been developed in the context of Codmine project. In the
association rule hiding context, two different heuristic-based approaches have
been proposed: one is based on data deletion according to which the original
database is modified by deleting the data values; the other is based on data
fuzzification, thus hiding the sensitive information by inserting unknown values
to the database. Before giving more details concerning the proposed approaches,
we briefly recall the problem formulation of association rule hiding.
3.2 Problem Formulation
Let D be a transactional database and I = {i1, . . . , in} be a set of items, which
represents the set of products that can be sold by the database owner. Each
transaction can be considered as subset of items in I. We assume that the items
in a transaction or an itemset are sorted in lexicographic order. According
to a bitmap notation, each transaction t in the database D is represented as
a triple < TID, values of items, size >, where TID is the identifier of the
transaction t, values of items is a list of values, one value for each item in I,
associated with transaction t. An item is supported by a transaction t if its
value in the values of items is 1, and it is not supported by t if its value in
the values of items is 0. Size is the number of 1 values which appear in the
values of items, that is the number of items supported by the transaction. An
association rule is an implication of the form X ⇒ Y between disjoint itemsets X
and Y in I. Each rule is assigned both to a support and to a confidence value.
The first one represents the probability to find in the database transactions
containing all the items in X ∪ Y , whereas the confidence is the probability
to find transactions containing all the items in X ∪ Y , once we know that they
contain X. Note that while the support is a measure of a frequency of a rule, the
confidence is a measure of the strength of the relation between the antecedent
X and the consequent Y of the rule. Association rule mining process consists
of two steps: 1) the identification of all the frequent itemsets, that is, all the
itemsets, whose supports are bigger than a pre-determined minimum support
threshold, min supp; 2) the generation of strong association rules from the
frequent itemsets, that is those frequent rules whose confidence values are bigger
than a minimum confidence threshold, min conf . Along with the confidence
and the support, a sensitivity level is assigned only to both frequent and strong
rules. If a strong and frequent rule is above a certain sensitivity level, the hiding
process should be applied in such a way that either the frequency or the strength
of the rule will be reduced below the min supp and the min conf correspondingly.
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The problem of association rule hiding can be stated as follows: given a database
D, a set R of relevant rules that are mined from D and a subset Rh of R, we
want to transform D into a database D′ in such a way that the rules in R can
still be mined, except for the rules in Rh.
3.3 Rule hiding algorithms based on data dele-
tion
Rule hiding approach based on data deletion operates by deleting the data
values in order to reduce either the support or the confidence of the sensi-
tive rule below the corresponding minimum support or confidence thresholds,
MST or MCT , which are fixed by the user, in such a way that the changes
introduced in the database are minimal. The decrease in the support of a rule
X ⇒ Y is done by decreasing the support of its generating itemset X ∪ Y ,
that is the support of either the rule antecedent X, or the rule consequent Y ,
through transactions that fully support the rule. The decrease in the confidence
Conf(X ⇒ Y ) = Supp(X⇒Y )
Supp(X) of the rule X ⇒ Y , instead, can be accomplished:
1) by decreasing the support of the rule consequent Y through transactions
that support both X and Y ; 2) by increasing the support of the rule antecedent
through transactions that do not fully support Y and partially support X. Five
data deletion algorithms have been developed for privacy preserving data min-
ing, whose pseudocodes are presented in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Algorithm
1 decreases the confidence of a sensitive rule below the min conf threshold by
increasing the support of the rule antecedent, while keeping the rule support
fixed. Algorithms 2 reduces the rule support by decreasing the frequency of the
consequent through transactions that support the rule. Algorithm 3 operates as
the previous one with the only exception that the choice of the item to remove
is done according to a minimum impact criterion. Finally, Algorithms 4 and 5
decrease the frequency of large itemsets from which sensitive rules can be mined.
3.4 Rule hiding algorithms based on data fuzzi-
fication
According to the data fuzzification approach, a sequence of symbols in the new
alphabet of an item {0,1,?} is associated with each transaction where one sym-
bol is associated with each item in the set of items I. As before, the ith value
in the list of values is 1 if the transaction supports the ith item, the value is 0
otherwise. The novelty of this approach is the insertion of an uncertainty sym-
bol, a question mark, in a given position of the list of values which means that
there is no information on whether the transaction supports the corresponding
item. In this case, the confidence and the support of an association rule may
be not unequivocally determined, but they can range between a minimum and
a maximum level. The minimum support of an itemset is defined as the per-
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INPUT: the source database D, the number |D| of transactions in D, a set Rh of rules to hide, the min conf threshold
OUTPUT: the database D transformed so that the rules in Rh cannot be mined
Begin
Foreach rule r in Rh do
{
1. T ′
lr
= {t ∈ D | t does not fully supports rr, and partially supports lr}
foreach transaction t in T ′
lr
do
{
2. t.num items = |I| − |lr ∩ t.values of items|
}
3. Sort(T ′
lr
) in descending order of number of items of lr contained
Repeat until(conf(r) < min conf)
{
4. t = T ′
lr
[1]
5. set all ones(t.values of items, lr)
6. Nlr = Nlr + 1
7. conf(r) = Nr/Nlr
8. Remove t from T ′
lr
}
9. Remove r from Rh
}
End
Figure 3.1: Algorithm 1 for Rule Hiding by Confidence Decrease
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INPUT: the source database D, the size of the
database |D|, a set Rh of rules to hide, the
min supp threshold, the min conf threshold
OUTPUT: the database D transformed so that
the rules in Rh cannot be mined
Begin
Foreach rule r in Rh do
{
1. Tr = {t ∈ D | t fully supports r}
foreach transaction t in Tr do
{
2. t.num items = count(t)
}
3. Sort(Tr) in ascending order of transaction size
Repeat until (supp(r) < min sup)
or (conf(r) < min conf)
{
4. t = Tr[1]
5. j = choose item(rr)
6. set to zero(j,t.values of items)
7. Nr = Nr − 1
8. supp(r) = Nr/|D|
9. conf(r) = Nr/Nlr
10. Remove t from Tr
}
11. Remove r from Rh
}
End
INPUT: the source database D, the size of the
database |D|, a set Rh of rules to hide, the
min supp threshold, the min conf threshold
OUTPUT: the database D transformed so that the
rules in Rh cannot be mined
Begin
Foreach rule r in Rh do
{
1. Tr = {t ∈ D | t fully supports r}
foreach transaction t in Tr do
{
2. t.num items = count(t)
}
3. Sort(Tr) in decreasing order of transaction size
Repeat until (supp(r) < min sup)
or (conf(r) < min conf)
{
4. t = Tr[1]
5. j = choose item(r)
6. set to zero(j,t.values of items)
7. Nr = Nr − 1
8. Recompute Nlr
9. supp(r) = Nr/|D|
10. conf(r) = Nr/Nlr
11. Remove t from Tr
}
12. Remove r from Rh
}
End
Figure 3.2: Algorithms 2 and 3 for Rule Hiding by Support Decrease
centage of transactions that certainly support the itemset, while the maximum
support represents the percentage of transactions that support or could support
the itemset. The minimum confidence of a rule is obviously the minimum level
of confidence that the rule can assume based on the support value, and similarly
for the maximum confidence. Given a rule r, minconf(r) = minsup(r)∗100
maxsup(lr)
and
maxconf(r) = maxsup(r)∗100
minsup(lr)
, where lr denotes the rule antecedent.
Considering the support interval and the minimum support threshold, MST ,
we have the following cases for an itemset A:
• A is hidden when maxsup(A) is smaller than MST ;
• A is visible with an uncertainty level when minsup(A) ≤ MST ≤
maxsup(A);
• A is visible if minsup(A) is greater than or equal to MST .
The same reasoning applies to the confidence interval and the minimum confi-
dence threshold (MCT ).
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INPUT: the source database D, the size of the
database |D|, a set L of large itemsets, the set Lh
of large itemsets to hide, the min supp threshold
OUTPUT: the database D modified by the
hiding of the large itemsets in Lh
Begin
1. Sort(Lh) in descending order of size and support
2. Th = {TZ | Z ∈ Lh and ∀t ∈ D :
t ∈ TZ =⇒ t supports Z}
Foreach Z in Lh
{
3. Sort(TZ) in ascending order of transaction size
Repeat until (supp(r) < min sup)
{
4. t = popfrom(TZ)
5. a = maximal support item in Z
6. aS = {X ∈ Lh|a ∈ X }
Foreach X in aS
{
7. if (t ∈ TX) delete(t, TX)
}
8. delete(a, t, D)
}
}
End
INPUT: the source database D, the size of the
database |D|, a set L of large itemsets, the set Lh
of large itemsets to hide, the min supp threshold
OUTPUT: the database D modified by the
hiding of the large itemsets in Lh
Begin
1. Sort(Lh) in descending order of support and size
Foreach Z in Lh do
{
2. i = 0
3. j = 0
4. < TZ > = sequence of transactions supporting Z
5. < Z > = sequence of items in Z
Repeat until (supp(r) < min sup)
{
6. a =< Z >[i]
7. t = < TZ >[j]
8. aS = {X ∈ Lh|a ∈ X }
Foreach X in aS
{
9. if (t ∈ TX) then delete(t, TX)
}
10. delete(a, t, D)
11. i = (i+1) modulo size(Z)
12. j = j+1
}
}
End
Figure 3.3: Algorithms 4 and 5 for Rule Hiding by Support Decrease of large
itemsets
Traditionally, a rule hiding process takes place according to two different
strategies: decreasing its support or its confidence. In this new context, the
adopted alternative strategies aim to introduce uncertainty in the frequency or
the importance of the rules to hide. The two strategies reduce the minimum
support and the minimum confidence of the itemsets generating these rules be-
low the minimum support threshold (MST ) and minimum confidence threshold
(MCT ) correspondingly by a certain safety margin (SM) fixed by the user.
The Algorithm 6 for reducing the support of generating large itemset of a sen-
sitive rule replaces 1’s by “ ? ” for the items in transactions supporting the
itemset until its minimum support goes below the minimum support threshold
MST by the fixed safety margin SM . Algorithms 7 and 8 operate reducing the
minimum confidence value of sensitive rules. The first one decreases the min-
imum support of the generating itemset of a sensitive rule by replacing items
of the rule consequent by unknown values. The second one, instead, increases
the maximum support value of the antecedent of the rule to hide via placing
question marks in the place of the zero values of items in the antecedent.
3.5. CONSIDERATIONS ON CODMINE ASSOCIATION RULE ALGORITHMS25
INPUT: the database D, a set L of large itemsets,
the set Lh of large itemsets to hide, MST and SM
OUTPUT: the database D modified by the fuzzification
of large itemsets in Lh
Begin
1. Sort Lh in descending order of size and
minimum support of the large itemsets
Foreach Z in Lh
{
2. TZ = {t ∈ D | t supports Z}
3. Sort the transaction in TZ in
ascending order of transaction size
Repeat until (minsup(r) < MST − SM)
{
4. Place a ? mark for the item with the
largest minimum support of Z in the
next transaction in TZ
5. Update the supports of the affected
itemsets
6. Update the database D
}
}
End
Figure 3.4: Algorithm 6 for Rule Hiding by Support Reduction
3.5 Considerations on Codmine Association Rule
Algorithms
Based on results obtained by the performed tests (See Appendix A for more
details), it is possible to make some considerations on the presented algorithms.
All these algorithms are able in any case (with the exclusion of the first al-
gorithm) to hide the target sensitive information. Moreover the performance
results are acceptable. The question is then: “Why there is the necessity to
improve these algorithms if they all work well?” There exist some coarse para-
meters allowing us to measure the impact of the algorithms on the DQ of the
released database. Just to understand here what is the problem, we say that
during the tests we discovered in the sanitized database a considerable number
of new rules (artifactual rules) not present in the original database. Moreover
we discovered that some of the not sensitive rules contained in the original data-
base, after the sanitization were erased (Ghost rules). This behavior in a critical
database could have a relevant impact. For example, as usual let us consider
the Health Database. The introduction of artifactual rules may deceive a doctor
that, on the basis of these rules, can choose a wrong therapy for a patient. In
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INPUT: the source database D, a set Rh
of rules to hide, MST , MCT and SM
OUTPUT: the database D transformed so that
the rules in Rh cannot be mined
Begin
Foreach r in Rh do
{
1. Tr={t in D | t fully supports r}
2. for each t in Tr count the number of items in t
3. sort the transactions in Tr in ascending order
of the number of items supported
Repeat until (minsup(r) < MST − SM)
or (minconf(r) < MCT − SM)
{
4. Choose the first transaction t ∈ Tr
5. Choose the item j in rr with the
highest minsup
6. Place a ? mark for the place of j in t
7. Recompute the minsup(r)
8. Recompute the minconf(r)
9. Recompute the minconf of other
affected rules
10. Remove t from Tr
}
11. Remove r from Rh
}
End
INPUT: the source database D, a set Rh
of rules to hide, MCT , and SM .
OUTPUT: the database D transformed so that
the rules in Rh cannot be mined
Begin
Foreach r in Rh do
{
1. T ′
lr
= {t in D | t partially supports lr
and t does not fully support rr}
2. for each t in T ′
lr
count the number of items of lr in t
3. sort the transactions in T ′
lr
in descending order of
the number of items of lr supported
Repeat until (minconf(r) < MCT − SM)
{
4. Choose the first transaction t ∈ T ′
lr
5. Place a ? mark in t for the items in lr
that are not supported by t
6. Recompute the maxsup(lr)
7. Recompute the minconf(r)
8. Recompute the minconf of other affected rules
9. Remove t from T ′
lr
}
10. Remove r from Rh
}
End
Figure 3.5: Algorithms 7 and 8 for Rule Hiding by Confidence Decrease
the same way, if some other rules are erased, a doctor could have a not complete
picture of the patient health, generating then some unpleasant situation. This
behavior is due to the fact that the algorithms presented act in the same way
with any type of categorical database, without knowing nothing about the use
of the database, the relationships between data etc. More specifically we note
that the key point of this uncorrect behavior is in the selection of the item to
be modified. In all these algorithm in fact, the items are selected randomly,
without considering their relevance and their impact on the database. We then
introduce an approach to select the proper set of items minimizing the impact
on the database
3.6 The Data Quality Strategy (First Part)
As explained before, we want to develop a family of PPDM algorithms which
take into account, during the sanitization phase, aspects related to the particu-
lar database we want to modify. Moreover we want such a PPDM family driven
by the DQ assurance. In the context of Association Rules PPDM algorithm,
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and more in detail in the family of Perturbation Algorithms described in the
previous section, we note that the point in which it is possible to act in order
to preserve the quality of the database, is the selection of the Item. In other
words the problem we want to solve is
How we can select the proper item to be modify, in order to limit the impact of
this modification on the quality of the database?
The DQ structure we introduced previously can help us in achieving this
goal. The general idea we suggest here it is relatively intuitive. In fact, a tar-
get DMG contains all the attributes involved in the construction of a relevant
aggregate information. Moreover a weight is associated with each attribute de-
noting its accuracy and completeness. Every constraint involving this attribute
is associated to a weight representing the relevance of its violation.
Finally, every AIS has its set of weights related to the three DQ measures and
it is possible to measure the global level of DQ guaranteed after the sanitiza-
tion. We are then able to evaluate the effect of an attribute modification on
the Global DQ of a target database. Assuming that we have available the Asset
schema related to a target database, our Data Hiding strategy can be described
as follows:
1. A sensitive rule s is identified
2. The items involved in s are identified
3. By inspecting inside the Asset schema, the DQ damage is computed sim-
ulating the modification of these items
4. An item ranking is built considering the results of the previous operation
5. The item with a lower impact is selected
6. The sanitization is executed by modifying the chosen item
The proposed strategy can be improved. In fact, to compute the effect of the
modifications, in case of very complex information, could be onerous in term of
performances.
We note that, in a target association rule, a particular type of items may exist,
that is not contained in any DMG of the database Asset. We call this type of
Items Zero Impact Items. The modification of these particular items has no
effect on the DQ of the database, because it was, in the Asset description phase,
judged not relevant for the aggregate information considered. The improvement
of our strategy is then the following: before starting the Asset inspection phase
we search for the existence of Zero-Impact Items related to the target rules.
If they exist, we do not perform the Asset inspection and we use one of these
Zero-Impact items in order to hide the target rule.
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3.7 Data Quality Distortion Based Algorithm
In the Distortion Based Algorithms, the database sanitization (i.e. the operation
by which a sensitive rule is hidden), it is obtained by the distortion of some values
contained in the transactions supporting the rule (partially or fully, depending
from the strategy adopted) to be hidden. In what we propose, assuming to
work with categorical databases like the classical Market Basket database 1,
the distortion strategy we adopt is similar to the one presented in the Codmine
algorithms. Once a good item is identified, a certain number of transactions
supporting the rule are modified changing the item value from 1 to 0 until the
confidence of the rule is under a certain threshold. Figure 3.6 shows the flow
diagram describing the algorithm.
As it is possible to see, the first operation required is the identification
of the rule to hide. In order to do this, it is possible to use a well known
algorithm, named APRIORI algorithm [5], that, given a database, extract all
the rules contained that have a confidence over a Threshold level 2. Detail on
this algorithm are described in the Appendix B. The output of this phase is a
set of rules. From this set, a sensitive rule will be identified (in general this
depends from its meaning in a particular context, but it is not in the scope of
our work to define when a rule must be considered sensitive). The next phase
implies the determination of the Zero Impact Items (if they exist) associated
wit the target rule.
If the Zero Impact Itemset is empty, it means no item exists contained in
the rule that can be assumed to be non relevant for the DQ of the database. In
this case it is necessary to simulate what happens to the DQ of the database,
when a non zero impact item is modified. The strategy we can adopt in this
case is the following: we calculate the support and the confidence of the target
rule before the sanitization (we can use the output obtained by the Apriori
Algorithm).Then we compute how many steps are needed in order to downgrade
the confidence of the rule under the minimum threshold (as it is possible to see
from the algorithm code, there is little difference between the case in which
the item selected is part of the antecedent or part of the consequent of the
rule). Once we know how many transactions we need to modify, it is easy,
inspecting the Asset, to calculate the impact on the DQ in terms of accuracy and
consistency. Note that in the distortion algorithm evaluating the completeness
is without meaning, because the data are not erased, but modified. The Item
Impact Rank Algorithm is reported in Figure 3.8.
The Sanitization algorithm works as follows:
1. It selects all the transactions fully supporting the rule to be hidden.
2. It computes the Zero Impact set and if there exist such type of items,
it randomly selects one of these items. If this set is empty, it calculates
1A market Basket Database is a database in which each transaction represents the products
acquired by the customers.
2This Threshold level represents the confidence over which a rule can be identified as
relevant and sure.
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Figure 3.6: Flow Chart of the DQDB Algorithm
the ordered set on Impact Items and it selects the one with the lower DQ
Effect.
3. Using the selected item, it modifies the selected transactions until the rule
is hidden.
The final algorithm is reported in Figure 3.9. Given the algorithm, for sake of
completeness we try to give an idea about its complexity.
• The search of all zero impact items, assuming the items to be ordered
according to a lexicographic order, can be executed in N ∗O(lg(M)) where
N is the size of the rule and M is the number of different items contained
in the Asset.
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INPUT: the Asset Schema A associated to the target database,
the rule Rh to be hidden
OUTPUT: the set (possibly empty) Zitem of zero Impact items discovered
1.Begin
2. zitem=∅;
3. Rsup=Rh;
4. Isup=list of the item contained in Rsup;
5. While (Isup 6= ∅)
6. {
7. res=0;
8. Select item from Isup;
9. res=Search(Asset, Item);
10. if (res==0)then zitem=zitem+item;
11. Isup=Isup-item;
12.}
13.return(zitem);
14.End
Figure 3.7: Zero Impact Algorithm
INPUT: the Asset Schema A associated
to the target database,the rule Rh to be hidden,
the sup(Rh), the sup(ant(Rh)), the Threshold Th
OUTPUT: the set Qitem ordered by Quality Impact
1. Begin
2. Qitem=∅;
3. Confa=
Sup(Rh)
Sup(ant(Rh))
4. Confp=Confa;
5. Nstep if ant=0;
6. Nstep if post=0;
7. While (Confa > Th) do
8. {
9. Nstep if ant++;
10. Confa=
Sup(Rh)−Nstep if ant
Sup(ant(Rh))−Nstep if ant
;
11.}
12.While (Confb > Th) do
13.{
14. Nstep if post++;
15. Confa=
Sup(Rh)−Nstep if post
Sup(ant(Rh))
;
16.}
17.For each item in Rh do
18.{
19. if (item ∈ ant(Rh)) then N=Nstep if ant;
20. else N=Nstep if post;
21. For each AIS ∈ Asset do
22. {
23. node=recover item(AIS,item);
24. Accur Cost=node.accuracy Weight ∗N ;
25. Constr Cost=Constr surf(N,node);
26. item.impact=item.impact+
(Accur Cost ∗AIS.Accur weight)+
+(Constr Cost ∗AIS.COnstr weight);
27. }
28.}
29.sort by impact(Items);
30.Return(Items);
End
Figure 3.8: Item Impact Rank Algorithm for the Distortion Based Algorithm
(we remember here that ant(Rh) indicates the antecedent component of a rule)
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• The Cost of the Impact Item Set computation is less immediate to formu-
late. However, the computation of the sanitization step is linear (O(bSup(Rh)c)).
Moreover the constraint exploration in the worst case has a complex-
ity in O(NC) where NC is the total number of constraints contained
in the Asset. This operation is repeated for each item in the rule Rh
and then it takes |Items|O(NC). Finally in order to sort the Item-
set, we can use the MergeSort algorithm, and then the complexity is
|itemset|O(lg(|itemset|)).
• The sanitization has a complexity in O(N) where N is the number of
transaction modified in order to hide the rule.
INPUT: the Asset Schema A associated to the target database,
the rule Rh to be hidden, the target database D
OUTPUT: the Sanitized Database
1.Begin
2. Zitem=DQDB Zero Impact(Asset,Rh);
3. if (Zitem 6= ∅) then item=random sel(Zitem);
4. else
5. {
6. Impact set=Items Impact rank(Asset,Rh,Sup(Rh),Sup(ant(Rh)), Threshold);
7. item=best(Impact set);
8. }
9. Tr={t ∈ D|tfully support Rh}
10.While (Rh.Conf >Threshold) do
11.sanitize(Tr;item);
12.End
Figure 3.9: The Distortion Based Sanitization Algorithm
3.8 Data Quality Based Blocking Algorithm
In the Blocking based algorithms the idea is to substitute the value of an item
supporting the rule we want to hide with a meaningless symbol. In this way, we
introduce an uncertainty related to the question “How to interpret this value?”.
The final effect is then the same of the Distortion Based Algorithm. The strategy
we propose here, as showed in Figure 3.10 is very similar to the one presented
in the previous section; the only difference is how to compute the Impact on the
Data Quality. For this reason the Zero Impact Algorithm is exactly the same
presented before for the DQDB Algorithm. However, some adjustments are
necessary in order to implement the Impact Item Rank Algorithm. The majors
modifications are related to the Number of Step Evaluation (that is of course
different) and the Data Quality evaluation. In fact, in this case it does not make
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sense to evaluate the Accuracy Lack, because every time an item is changed,
the new value is meaningless. For this reason in this case we consider the pair
(Completeness, Consistency) and not the pair (Accuracy, Consistency). Figure
3.11 reports the new Impact Item Rank Algorithm.
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Figure 3.10: Flow Chart of BBDB Algorithm
The last part of the algorithm is quite similar to the one presented for the
DBDQ Algorithm. The only relevant difference is the insertion of the “?” value
instead of the 0 value. From the complexity point of view, the complexity is the
same of the complexity of the previous algorithm.
3.9 The Data Quality Strategy (Second Part)
Preliminary tests performed on these algorithms show that the impact on the
DQ of the database is reduced. However, we note an interesting phenomenon.
In what follows we give a description of this phenomena, an interpretation and
a first solution
Consider a DataBase D to be sanitized. D contains a set of four sensitive
rules. In order to protect these rules we normally execute the following steps:
1. We select a rule Rh from the pool of sensitive rules.
2. We apply our algorithm (DQDB or BBDQ).
3. We obtain a sanitized database in which the DQ is preserved (with respect
to the rule Rh).
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INPUT: the Asset Schema A associated
to the target database,the rule Rh to be hidden,
the sup(Rh), the sup(ant(Rh)), the Threshold Th
OUTPUT: the set Qitem ordered by Quality Impact
1. Begin
2. Qitem=∅;
3. Confa=
Sup(Rh)
Sup(ant(Rh))
4. Nstep.ant=countstep ant(confa,Thresholds (Min..Max))
5. Nstep.post=countstep post(confa,Thresholds (Min..Max))
6. For each item in Rh do
7. {
8. if (item ∈ ant(Rh)) then N=Nstep.ant;
9. else N=Nstep.post;
10. For each AIS ∈ Asset do
11. {
12. node=recover item(AIS,item);
24. Complet Cost=node.Complet Weight ∗N ;
25. Constr Cost=Constr surf(N,node);
26. item.impact=item.impact+
+(Complet Cost ∗AIS.Complet weight)+
+(Constr Cost ∗AIS.Constr weight);
27. }
28.}
29.sort by impact(Items);
30.Return(Items);
End
Figure 3.11: Item Impact Rank Algorithm for the Blocking Based Algorithm
4. We reapply the process for all the rules contained in the set of sensitive
rules.
What we observed in a large number of tests is that even if after every
sanitization the DQ related to a single rule is preserved (or at least the damage
is mitigated), at the end of the whole sanitization (every rule hidden), the
database had a lower level of DQ that the one we expected.
Reflecting on the motivation of this behavior, we argue that the sanitization
of a certain rule Ra may damage the DQ related to a previously sanitized rule
Rp having for example some items in common.
For this reason here we propose an improvement to our strategy to address
(but not to completely solve) this problem. It is important to notice that this
is a common problem for all the PPDM Algorithm and it is not related only to
the algorithm we proposed in the previous sections.
The new strategy is based on the following intuition: The Global DQ degra-
dation is due to the fact that in some sanitization items are modified that were
involved in other already sanitized rules. If we try to limit the number of dif-
ferent items modified during the whole process (i.e. during the sanitization of
the whole rules set), we obtain a better level of DQ. An approach to limit the
number of modified items is to identify the items supporting the biggest number
of sensitive rules as the most suitable to be modified and then performing in a
burst the sanitization of all the rules. The strategy we adopt can be summarized
as follows:
1. We classify the items supporting the rules contained in the sensitive set
analyzing how many rules simultaneously contain the same item (we count
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the occurrences of the items in the different rules).
2. We identify, given the sensitive set, the Global Set of Zero Impact Items.
3. We order the Zero Impact Set by considering the previously counted oc-
currences.
4. The sanitization starts by considering the Zero Impact Items that support
the maximum number of Rules.
5. Simultaneously all the rules supported by the chosen item are sanitized
and removed from the sensitive set, when they result hidden.
6. If the Zero Impact Set is not sufficient to hide every sensitive rule, for the
remaining items their DQ Impact is computed.
7. From the resulting classification, if several items exist with the same im-
pact, the one supporting the highest number of rules is chosen.
8. The process continues until all the rules are hidden.
From a methodological point of view, we can divide the complete strategy we
proposed into three main blocks:
• Pre Hiding phase
• Multi Zero Impact Hiding
• Multi Low Impact Hiding
This strategy can be easily applied to the algorithms presented before. For this
reason we present in the remainder of this report the algorithms giving, at the
end, a more general algorithm.
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3.10 Pre-Hiding Phase
INPUT: The sensitive Rules set Rs, the list of the database items
OUTPUT: The list of the items supporting the rules sorted by occurrences number
1.Begin
2. Rsup=Rs;
3. while (Rsup 6= ∅) do
4. {
5. select r from Rsup;
6. for (i = 0; i + +; i ≤ transactionmaxsize) do
7. if (item[i] ∈ r) then
8. {
9. item[i].count++;
10. item[i].list=item[i].list∪r;
11. }
12. Rsup=Rsup− r;
13.}
14.sort(item);
15.Return(item); End
Figure 3.12: The Item Occurrences classification algorithm
INPUT: The sensitive Rules set Rs, the list of the database items
OUTPUT: The list of the Zero Impact Items
1.Begin
2. Rsup=Rs;
3. Isup=list of all the items;
4. Zitem = ∅
5. while (Rsup 6= ∅) and (Isup 6= ∅) do
6. {
7. select r from Rsup;
8. for each (item ∈ r) do
9. {
10. if (item ∈ Isup) then
11. if (item /∈ Asset) then Zitem = Zitem + item;
12. Isup = Isup− item
13. }
14. Rsup = Rsup− r
15.}
16.return(Zitem)
End
Figure 3.13: The Multi Rule Zero Impact Algorithm
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This phase executes all the operations not specifically related to the hiding
operations. More in details, in this phase, the items are classified according to
the number of supported rules. Moreover the Zero Impact Items are classified
according to the same criteria. Figure 3.12 reports the algorithm used to discover
the occurrences of the items. This algorithm takes as input the set of sensitive
rules and the list of all the different items defined for the target database. For
every rule contained in the set, we check if the rule is supported by every item
contained in the Item list. If this is the case, a counter associated with the item
is incremented and an identifier associated with the rule is inserted into the list
of the rules supported by a certain item. This information is used in one of the
subsequent steps in order to optimize the computation. Once a rule has been
checked with every item in the list, it is removed from the sensitive set. From
a computational point of view, it is relevant to note that the entire process is
executed a number of times equal to:
|sensitive set| ∗ |Item List|
Figure 3.13 reports the algorithm used to identify the Zero Impact Items for
the sensitive Rules set. It is quite similar to the one presented in the previous
section, the difference is just that it searches in a burst the Zero-Impact items
for all the sensitive rules.
3.11 Multi Rules Zero Impact Hiding
The application of the two algorithms presented before returns two important
information:
• The items supporting more than a rule, and more in details, the exact
number of rules supported by these Items.
• The items supporting a rule ∈ sensitive rules set that have the impor-
tant property of being without impact on the DQ of the database.
Using these relevant information, we are then able to start the sanitization
process for those rules supported by Zero Impact Items. The strategy we adopt
is thus as follows:
1. We extract from the list of Items, in an ordered manner, the items already
identified as Zero Impact (the Izm set).
2. For each item contained in the new set, we build the set of the sensitive
rules supported (Rss) and the set of transactions supporting one of the
rules contained in Rss (Tss).
3. We then select a transaction in Tss and we perform the sanitization on
this transaction (by using either blocking or distortion).
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4. We recompute the support and the confidence value for the rules contained
in the Rss set and if one of the rule results hidden, it is removed from the
Rss set and from the Rs set.
5. These operations are repeated for every item contained in the Izm set.
The result of this approach can be:
• A sanitized Data Base with an optimal DQ: this is the case in
which all sensitive rules are supported by Zero Impact Items.
• A partially Sanitized Data Base with an optimal DQ: this is the
case in which the sensitive set has a subset of rules not supported by
Zero Impact Items.
Obviously, in a real case, the first result rarely happens. For this reason in this
we present the last step of our strategy, that allows us to obtain in any case a
completely sanitized database
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INPUT: The sensitive Rules set Rs, the list of the database items (with the Rule support),
the list of Zero Impact Items, the Database D
OUTPUT: A partially Sanitized Database PS
1.Begin
2. Izm={item ∈ Itemlist|item ∈ Zitem};
3. for (i = 0, i + +, i = |Izm|) do
4. {
5. Rss={r ∈ Rs|Izm[i] ∈ r}
6. Tss={t ∈ D|tfullysupportarule ∈ Rss}
7. while(Tss 6= ∅)and(Rss 6= ∅) do
8. {
9. select a transaction from Tss;
10. Tss = Tss− t;
11. Sanitize(t,Izm[i]);
12. Recompute Sup Conf(Rss);
13. ∀r ∈ Rss|(r.sup < minsup)Or(r.conf < minconf) do
14. {
15. Rss=Rss-r;
16. Rs=Rs-r;
17 }}}
End
Figure 3.14: The Multi Rules Zero Impact Hiding Algorithm
3.12 Multi Rule Low Impact algorithm
In this section we consider the case in which we need to sanitize a database
having a sensitive Rules set not supported by Zero Impact Items. In this case,
we have two possibilities: to use the Algorithm presented in the data quality
section that has the advantage of being very efficient, or, if we prefer to maintain
as much as possible a good DQ, to extend the concept of Multi-Rule approach
to this particular case. The strategy we propose here can be summarized as
follows:
1. We extract from the ordered list of items, only the items supporting the
rules contained in the sensitive Rules set. Each item contains the list of
the supported rules.
2. For each item and for each rule contained in the list of the supported
rules the estimated DQ impact is computed.The Maximum Data Quality
Impact estimated is associated to every item.
3. The Items are sorted by Max Impact and number of supported rules.
4. For each item contained in the new ordered set, we build the set of the
sensitive rules supported (Rss) and the set of transactions supporting one
of the rules contained in Rss (Tss).
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5. We then select a transaction in Tss and we perform the sanitization on
this transaction (blocking or distortion).
6. We recompute the support and the confidence value for the rules contained
in the Rss set and if one of the rule results hidden, it is removed from the
Rss set and from the Rs set.
7. These operations are repeated for every item contained in the Izm set
until all rules are sanitized.
The resulting database will be Completely Sanitized and the damage
related to the data quality will be mitigated. Figure 3.15 reports the algorithm.
As it is possible to note, in the algorithm we do not specify if the sanitization
is based on blocking or distortion. We consider this operation as a black box.
The proposed strategy is completely independent from the type of sanitization
used. In fact it is possible to substitute the code for blocking algorithm with
the code for distortion algorithm without compromising the DQ properties we
want to preserve with our algorithm. Figure 3.16 reports the global algorithm
formalizing our strategy. More in details, taking as input to this algorithm
the Asset description, the group of rules to be sanitized, the database and the
thresholds under which consider hidden a rule, the algorithm computes the
Zero-Impact set, and the Item-Occurrences rank. Then it will try to hide the
rules modifying the Zero Impact Items and finally, if there exist other rules to
be hidden, the Low Impact Algorithm is invoked.
INPUT: the Asset Schema A associated
to the target database,the sensitive Rules set Rs
to be hidden, the Thresholds Th, the list of items
OUTPUT: the sanitized database SDB
1. Begin
2. Iml={item ∈ itemlist|itemsupportsaruler ∈ Rs}
3. for each item ∈ Iml do
4. {
5. for each rule ∈ item.list do
6. {
7. N=computestepitem,thresholds;
8. For each AIS ∈ Asset do
9. {
10. node=recover item(AIS,item);
11. item.list.rule.cost=Item.list.rule.cost
+ComputeCost(node,N);
12. }
13. item.maxcost=maxcost(item);
14. }
15. Sort Iml by max cost and rule supported.
16.While(Rs 6= ∅)do
17.{
18. Rss={r ∈ Rs|Iml[1] ∈ r}
19. Tss={t ∈ D|tfullysupportarule ∈ Rss}
20. while(Tss 6= ∅)and(Rss 6= ∅) do
21. {
22. select a transaction from Tss;
23. Tss = Tss− t;
24. Sanitize(t,Iml[1]);
25. Recompute Sup Conf(Rss);
26. ∀r ∈ Rss|(r.sup < minsup)Or
(r.conf < minconf) do
27. {
28. Rss=Rss-r;
29. Rs=Rs-r;
30. }
31. }
32. Ilm=Ilm-Ilm[1];
33.}
34.} End
Figure 3.15: Low Data Quality Impact Algorithm
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INPUT: The sensitive Rules set Rs, the Database D, the Asset
the thresholds
OUTPUT: A Sanitized Database PS
1.Begin
2. Item=Item Occ Class(Rs,Itemlist);
3. Zitem=Multi Rule Zero Imp(Rs,Itemlist);
4. if (Zitem 6= ∅) then MR zero Impact H(D,Rs,Item,Zitem);
5. if (Rs 6= ∅) then MR low Impact H(D,Rs,Item);
End
Figure 3.16: The General Algorithm
Chapter 4
Conclusions
The problem of the sanitization impact on the quality of the database has been,
to the best of our knowledge, never addressed by previous approaches to the
PPDM. In this work, we have explored the concepts related to DQ. Moreover we
have identified the most suitable set of parameters that can be used to represent
the DQ in the context of PPDM. Previous approaches have addressed the PPDM
problem not considering the intrinsic meaning of the information stored in a
database. This lack is the main cause of the DQ problem. In fact the DQ is
strongly related to the use of the data and then, indirectly to the meaning of the
data. Starting from this consideration, we introduced a formal schema allowing
us to represent the relevant information stored into a database. This schema is
able to magnify the relevance of each attribute contained into a set of high level
information, the relationships among the attributes and the relevance of the DQ
parameters associated with the Information Schema. Based on this schema, we
proposed a first strategy and two PPDM algorithms (distortion and blocking
based) with the aim of obtaining a sanitization which is better with respect to
DQ. We have then refined our strategy in order to hide simultaneously a set of
sensible rules. On the basis of this new strategy, we have proposed then a suite
of algorithms allowing us to build a most sophisticated PPDM Data Quality
Based Algorithm.
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